2006 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

6-5-2006

Montclair Bd Ed v. M W D

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006

Recommended Citation
"Montclair Bd Ed v. M W D" (2006). 2006 Decisions. 958.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/958

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2006 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-4536
____________

MONTCLAIR BOARD OF EDUCATION
v.
M.W.D. on behalf of D.W.D.,
Appellant
_____________________
Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-03516)
District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 10, 2006
Before: RENDELL, AMBRO and *ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed June 5, 2006)
_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
PER CURIAM
On June 6, 2005, Montclair Board of Education (“Montclair”) and M.W.D., the
parent of D.W.D., entered into a settlement agreement relating to the educational
_______________________________________________
* Judge Roth assumed senior status as of May 31, 2006

placement of D.W.D.1 Montclair agreed to provide D.W.D. with independent
neuropsychological, psychiatric, educational, and assistive technology evaluations.
(Supp. App. at pa40, Settlement Agreement ¶ 2). So that the evaluations could be
completed, M.W.D. agreed to sign a release for the release of D.W.D.’s records. (Id.)
The settlement agreement also provided the following:
Pending the results of the independent evaluations, the parent and D.W.D.
has [sic] agreed to participate in the enrollment/application process for the
Sage Day School, a private day school for the disabled, or another
appropriate out of district day program.
If D.W.D. is accepted at Sage Day School, the District agrees to pay for the
ESY [Extended School Year] provided at Sage. If D.W.D. is not accepted
at Sage Day School, the District agrees to provide D.W.D. with ESY services
in the form of twenty (20) hours of tutoring in the five (5) major subjects
that D.W.D. has studied this school year over the course of four (4) weeks in
July 2005.
(Id., Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 4 & 5). The settlement agreement also allowed either party
to bring an action to enforce its terms. (Id. at pa41, Settlement Agreement ¶ 9.)
On July 8, 2005, Montclair filed a complaint in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey. In the caption, Montclair named “M.W.D o/b/o D.W.D.” as
the defendant, and in the text, Montclair referred to M.W.D. as the defendant. (Supp.
App. at pa30.) Montclair alleged that Sage Day School had accepted D.W.D. for the ESY
program, and that M.W.D. was violating the settlement agreement by not presenting
D.W.D. for the bus to take him there. (Id. at pa 31-32.) Montclair requested that the

1

D.W.D. was identified as a party to the settlement in the text of the agreement, but he
was not a signatory to it.
2

District Court order M.W.D. to comply with the settlement agreement “by presenting
D.W.D. for placement on the bus and at Sage Day’s summer program” and “such other
relief as the court deems equitable and just.” (Id. at pa33.) With the complaint, Montclair
filed a letter brief, in which it requested immediate enforcement of the settlement
agreement, noting that the Sage summer program ran from June 27, 2005, to July 29,
2005. (Letter Brief dated July 8, 2005.)
On the same day that Montclair’s complaint was entered on the docket, the District
Court issued an order to show cause why the District Court should not order that
“Defendant must comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement” and “D.W.D. will
attend the Sage Summer Day Program immediately.” (Order of July 15, 2005.) Pending
a hearing, the District Court restrained M.W.D. from deviating from the terms of the
settlement agreement by not placing D.W.D. on the bus for the Sage ESY program. (Id.)
M.W.D. filed an answer to Montclair’s complaint and letter brief. With her
answer, she included counterclaims against Montclair, asserting that Montclair was in
breach of the settlement agreement. (Supp. App. at pa74.) She argued that she and
D.W.D. had agreed to participate in the application process for Sage Day School, but that
D.W.D. was not required to attend Sage Day School until the independent evaluations
were completed. (Id. at pa73.) She asked the District Court to find Montclair in breach
of the agreement because, among other things, it failed to provide independent
evaluations and brought an action to force D.W.D. to go to a program not deemed
appropriate by independent evaluators. (Id. at pa74.) She also requested compensatory
3

educational services for her son to make up for Montclair’s alleged breach and purported
failure to provide a free appropriate public education in the previous school year. (Id. at
pa74-pa75.)
The District Court held a hearing on August 9, 2005. The Sage ESY program had
ended without D.W.D. having attended it for one day. (Supp. App. at pa6-pa7.) At the
hearing, the District Court, noting that the summer term was over, asked the parties what
they wanted the District Court to do. (Id. at pa6.) Montclair asked that D.W.D. be
ordered to go to Sage Day School in September. (Id. At pa13.) At first, the District Court
remarked that such a request was not in the papers filed by Montclair, but then the
District Court considered the language of the settlement agreement. (Id. at pa21-pa25.)
The District Court also took testimony regarding the completion of independent
evaluations of D.W.D., including M.W.D.’s cooperation with the process. (Id. at pa13pa17.) M.W.D. attempted to bring her claim for compensatory educational services to the
District Court’s attention, but the District Court concluded that the issue was not before it.
(Id. at pa27.)

At the hearing, the District Court declared the following: “I’m going

to hold that this agreement meant that [D.W.D.] would go to Sage pending the
independent evaluations.” (Id. at pa26.) The District Court explained to M.W.D.,
“[D.W.D. is] going to go to Sage, as it says in the agreement . . . . [i]t’s my ruling that he
attend there.” (Id. at pa26-27.) The District Court then entered the following written
order:
ORDERED that Defendant, M.W.D. be and hereby is restrained from
4

violating the terms of the settlement agreement entered into between
the parties on June 6, 2005; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that D.W.D. will attend, at district expense,
the program offered at the Sage Day School, a private school for children
with disabilities, until such time as independent evaluations are completed
and an IEP meeting is held to consider the findings of those independent
evaluations.
(Order of August 18, 2005.)
“M.W.D. o/b/o D.W.D.” appeals from the District Court’s order. (Supp. App. at
pa1.) To the extent that we have jurisdiction over this appeal, we proceed under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). This appeal, in part, relates to an order granting injunctive relief.
See United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 591 (3d Cir. 1992) (“To actually fall within
the scope of section 1292(a)(1) and be deemed an ‘injunction,’ the order must be
“directed to a party, enforceable by contempt, and designed to accord or protect some or
all of the substantive relief sought by a complaint in more than preliminary fashion.””).2
We have jurisdiction over an appeal from M.W.D. on her own behalf, as the
District Court restrained her from violating the terms of the settlement agreement.
However, although M.W.D. contends that the District Court drew the wrong conclusion
about her level of cooperation with the independent evaluation process, she does not
appeal from that aspect of the District Court’s order directed toward her. Therefore, we
will affirm the District Court’s order as to her.

2

Although Montclair’s original complaint related only to the settlement agreement
provisions about the Sage Day School ESY program, the District Court implicitly allowed
Montclair to amend its complaint at the hearing to seek broader relief.
5

On appeal, M.W.D. focuses most of her arguments on her disagreement with the
District Court’s decision to require D.W.D. to attend Sage Day School pending the
outcome of the evaluations. She also takes issue with the District Court’s decision to
allow the case to proceed without counsel representing D.W.D. In essence, and as she
captioned her appeal, M.W.D. appeals on behalf of her son.
However, M.W.D. may not represent her son in place of an attorney in federal
litigation. See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991).3
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the appeal should be dismissed, as Montclair claims.
(Appellee’s Brief at 9.) Instead, because M.W.D. represented her son in the District
Court, we will vacate the District Court’s order requiring D.W.D. to attend Sage Day
School pending the completion of independent evaluations. See Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at
878, 883. On remand, the District Court may wish to consider whether D.W.D., having
reached the age of majority, is a competent adult. If D.W.D. is a competent adult, he may
choose to represent himself or employ an attorney. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; see also OseiAfriyie, 937 F.2d at 882-83 (citing Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc.,
906 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1990)). If D.W.D. is not a competent adult, the District Court may
wish to determine whether it should appoint counsel to represent him.
In addition to appealing from the District Court’s order granting injunctive relief,

3

D.W.D. has reached the age of majority. However, a mother who is not a lawyer may
no more represent her adult son than she may represent her infant. See Collinsgru v.
Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The rule that a non-lawyer may
not represent another person in court is a venerable common law rule.”)
6

M.W.D. refers to her counterclaims, and seeks to argue that Montclair breached the
settlement agreement. However, we do not have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 over this aspect of her appeal, despite the District Court’s characterization of its
order as final, because M.W.D.’s counterclaims are still pending in the District Court.
See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 640 (3d Cir. 1991)
(requiring, for purposes of finality, a judgment final “as to all claims and as to all
parties”). Nor do we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), as the District Court
did not deny the request for injunctive relief that accompanied M.W.D.’s counterclaims.
The District Court merely concluded that M.W.D.’s counterclaims were not before it at
the hearing it held. (Supp. App. at pa27.)
In sum, we will affirm the District Court’s order to the extent that it restrained
M.W.D. from violating the terms of the settlement agreement entered. We will vacate the
District Court’s order to the extent it required D.W.D. to attend the program offered at
Sage Day School pending the completion of independent evaluations and the occurrence
of an IEP meeting to consider the finding of those independent evaluations. In all other
respects, we will dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. We remand this
matter to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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